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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--NOFORN

DIST: 20 FEBRUARY 2001

COUNTRY: CONGO(K)/ANGOLA

SUBJ: COMMENTS BY KINSHASA RESIDENTS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA, AND RESENTMENT OF ANGOLAN TROOPS

DOI: [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

SOURCE: [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)



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SUMMARY: MANY CONGOLESE VIEWED THE DEATH OF DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA AS AN UNFORTUNATE NECESSITY -- HE HAD DONE NOTHING IN THREE YEARS TO HELP THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE, EITHER POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY, AND HIS PASSING WOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR A NEW ORDER TO ASSUME CONTROL AND TO END THE WAR. THERE WAS SOME RESENTMENT AMONG CONGOLESE RESIDENTS OF KINSHASA OF THE ARRIVAL OF ANGOLAN AND ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN KINSHASA, BECAUSE OF CONCERNS THAT THE ALLIES WERE TRYING TO DIRECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS. SEVERAL THEORIES WERE CIRCULATING IN KINSHASA ABOUT THE MOTIVE FOR THE ASSASSINATION, THE MOST PROMINENT BEING REVENGE BY NATIVES OF KIVU PROVINCE. IN THE VIEW OF ONE OBSERVER, MOST CONGOLESE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S BODYGUARD WAS NOT THE ASSASSIN, AND THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT WHO MAY HAVE BEEN BEHIND THE MURDER BUT NO GENERAL CONSENSUS ON THE INSTIGATORS OF THE ASSASSINATION.

TEXT: 1. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

2. [redacted] A GROUP OF MIDDLE-CLASS RESIDENTS OF KINSHASA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DROC), SAID THAT MANY CONGOLESE VIEWED THE DEATH OF DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA AS AN UNFORTUNATE NECESSITY -- HE HAD DONE NOTHING IN THREE YEARS TO HELP THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE, EITHER POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY, AND HIS PASSING WOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR A NEW ORDER TO ASSUME CONTROL AND TO END THE WAR. MOST KINSHASA RESIDENTS WERE INDIFFERENT TO THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH, VIEWING IT AS AN INTERNAL CONFLICT AMONG ARROGANT KATANGAN MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ENTOURAGE. [redacted] COMMENT: MOST PEOPLE STAYED HOME DURING THE PRESIDENT'S FUNERAL; THE MASSES OF MOURNERS WERE COMPOSED OF YOUNG BEGGARS WHO HAD BEEN FED BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE HOLIDAYS AT THE END OF 2000.) BUT SOME CONGOLESE COMMENTATORS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE ASSASSINATION HAD OPENED UP THE CONGO TO A "CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE"; I.E., NO PREVIOUS CONGOLESE LEADER HAD BEEN KILLED IN OFFICE, AND THIS ASSASSINATION SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING KABILA'S DEATH, SOME OBSERVERS FEARED THAT A GENOCIDE WOULD BE UNLEASHED, SUCH AS IN RWANDA FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT JUVENAL HABYARIMANA IN 1994. (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)

3. SOME FORMER ZAIRE ARMED FORCES (EX-FAZ) OFFICERS RESENTED WHAT THEY VIEWED AS THE ATTEMPT BY PRESIDENTIAL AIDE-DE-CAMP EDDY ((KAPEND)) TO USURP POWER WHEN HE APPEARED ON TELEVISION LATE 16 JANUARY DENYING THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DEAD AND CALLING FOR CALM ON THE PART OF THE MILITARY AND POLICE. THESE EX-FAZ OFFICERS BELIEVED THAT COLONEL KAPEND HAD NO RIGHT TO ISSUE ORDERS TO CONGOLESE ARMED FORCES (FAC) GENERALS, OR TO SPEAK IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT. NEVERTHELESS, CALM REIGNED IN KINSHASA, IN THE TRADITIONAL CONGOLESE SPIRIT OF RESPECT FOR THE DEAD AND OBSERVING A DECENT PERIOD OF MOURNING. [redacted] COMMENT: CONTRIBUTING TO THE SENSE OF CALM, THERE WERE RUMORS THAT MANY FAC SOLDIERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE AT CAMP KOKOLO, HAD BEEN DISARMED THE DAY BEFORE, ON 15 JANUARY.) (b)(1) (b)(3)

4. ANGOLAN AND ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS ARRIVED QUICKLY TO MAINTAIN ORDER, BUT MANY CONGOLESE RESIDENTS OF KINSHASA RESENTED THE ANGOLAN AND ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS, WHOM THEY FELT WERE TRYING TO DICTATE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE DROC; SOME EXPRESSED THE HOPE



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THAT KABILA WOULD TELL ANGOLA AND ZIMBABWE TO STOP PURSUING THE MILITARY OPTION TO THE DROC CRISIS. FURTHER FUELING RESENTMENT OF THE SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) ALLIES WERE REPORTS THAT JOSEPH KABILA, WHO IS REPORTED NOT TO LIKE KATANGANS, MOVED OUT ALL THE KATANGANS WHO WERE LIVING AT THE OAU CITY II TO MAKE ROOM FOR THE ANGOLAN AND ZIMBABWEAN TROOPS WHO ARRIVED IN MID-LATE JANUARY. [redacted] COMMENT: CONGOLESE CITIZENS QUESTION WHY ANGOLAN TROOPS ARE NECESSARY, SINCE THE ANGOLANS ARE NO BETTER SOLDIERS THAN THE CONGOLESE; AFTER ALL, THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DEFEAT UNITA DESPITE CONSTANT FIGHTING FOR 25 YEARS.) (b)(1) (b)(3)

5. [redacted] THE MAN ACCUSED OF KILLING PRESIDENT KABILA, RACHID KASEREKA, WAS SECOND IN COMMAND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS. RACHID WAS A NATIVE OF KIVU PROVINCE AND REPORTEDLY WAS RECRUITED PERSONALLY BY LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA IN 1996 IN BUKAVU OR GOMA. [redacted] COMMENT: RACHID'S MOTIVE FOR THE ATTACK IS NOT KNOWN, BUT MAY COME TO LIGHT THROUGH THE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE INQUIRY COMMISSION.) RACHID WAS SAID TO HAVE SERVED WITH COMMANDANT ANSELME MASASU NINDANG, WHO WAS ARRESTED IN OCTOBER 2000 FOR COUP PLOTTING AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED. ACCORDING TO ONE ACCOUNT, MORE THAN 400 YOUNG KIVU SOLDIERS WERE EXECUTED FOR SUPPORTING MASASU. THE MOST RECENT EXECUTIONS WERE SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE NO LATER THAN 15 JANUARY, IN THE PRESENCE OF LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA AND RACHID; RACHID REPORTEDLY PLEADED IN VAIN WITH KABILA TO SPARE THE MEN. ACCORDING TO MIDDLE-CLASS KINSHASA RESIDENTS, THE MOST PROMINENT THEORY IN CIRCULATION IS THAT RACHID AND OTHER KIVU NATIVES SOUGHT REVENGE FOR THE EXECUTION OF MASASU AND HIS COLLABORATORS. THIS THEORY IS SUPPORTED BY REPORTS OF DESERTIONS BY APPROXIMATELY 20 KIVU NATIVES SERVING IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (ANR), WHO HAD LONG COMPLAINED OF MISTREATMENT BY ANR OFFICERS WHO WERE KATANGA PROVINCE NATIVES. [redacted] COMMENT: RACHID ALSO REPORTEDLY SERVED WITH FORMER FAC CHIEF OF STAFF JAMES ((KABAREBE)). KABARABE DESERTED THE DROC IN JULY 1998 AND IS CURRENTLY RWANDAN DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)

6. ANOTHER RUMOR HOLDS THAT RACHID WAS ACTING ON BEHALF OF CONGOLESE LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLC) LEADER JEAN-PIERRE ((BEMBA)), WHO HOPED TO MOVE IN AND CAPTURE KINSHASA. REPORTEDLY, BEMBA'S PLANS WERE THWARTED BY THE QUICK ACTION OF ANGOLA TO MOVE IN TROOPS TO CONTROL THE CITY. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] [redacted] THERE IS NO SOLID INFORMATION ON THE MOTIVE, AND THIS SEEMS ONE OF THE LESS CREDIBLE ONES. THE INQUIRY COMMISSION HOPES TO HAVE COMPLETED ITS INVESTIGATION BY 6 MARCH.) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)

7. THE HEAD OF THE DROC PRESIDENTIAL GUARD UNIT IS MAJOR ((MUTUPAYI)) (FNU), AN EX-FAZ OFFICER AND A NATIVE OF KASAI PROVINCE WHO GREW UP IN LUBUMBASHI. HE REPORTEDLY IS THE ONLY EX-FAZ OFFICER TO HAVE SERVED IN THE SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY GROUP (GSSP) WHO REMAINED IN THE UNIT AFTER IT WAS INCORPORATED INTO THE KINSHASA DEFENSE FORCE (FORCES D'INTERVENTION DE LA SECURITE (FIS), FORMERLY KNOWN AS FORCES D'INTERVENTION DE LA CAPITAL (FIC).)

8. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

9. THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA HIT



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THE CONGOLESE POPULATION LIKE A SHOCKWAVE. AFTER THE FIRST NEWS ARRIVED, INFORMATION CIRCULATED QUICKLY ON THE DETAILS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MURDER. DESPITE DROC GOVERNMENT ASSERTIONS THAT PRESIDENT KABILA DIED ON 18 JANUARY IN HARARE OF WOUNDS SUFFERED DURING THE ATTACK ON HIM, THE POPULATION IS WELL AWARE THAT KABILA WAS ACTUALLY KILLED IN HIS OFFICE IN KINSHASA BEFORE NOON ON 16 JANUARY. MOST PEOPLE, INCLUDING SOME DROC SECURITY OFFICIALS, BELIEVE THAT RACHID KASEREKA, A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S CLOSE PROTECTION DETAIL, WAS NOT THE ASSASSIN, AS WAS REPORTED IN THE PRESS. THEY ALSO DO NOT THINK THE ASSASSIN, WHOEVER HE WAS, ACTED ALONE, AND THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT WHO MAY HAVE BEEN BEHIND THE MURDER BUT NO GENERAL CONSENSUS ON THE INSTIGATORS OF THE ASSASSINATION.

10. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE WERE RELIEVED: TO MOST OF THE POPULATION, PRESIDENT KABILA WAS A ROADBLOCK TO PEACE, SECURITY, AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. THE TRANSPORTATION AND FUEL SITUATION PROBLEMS REMARKABLY IMPROVED IN THE DAYS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH, AND THE LARGEST "CONCERN" AMONG THE PEOPLE SEEMED TO BE THAT YOUNG PRESIDENT JOSEPH KABILA MIGHT HAVE A TUTSI MOTHER, AND THAT THIS WOULD FACE HIM WITH PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO KEEPING THE COUNTRY UNITED. THE OVERALL FEELING AMONG THE POPULATION WAS THAT JOSEPH KABILA MIGHT SECRETLY BE WILLING TO SEE THE DROC PARTITIONED INTO THREE OR FOUR INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES.

POC: [redacted] (b)(3)
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
ACQ: [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
DISSEM: [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
[redacted] USUN, US SURVEY DIVISION SHAPE, USCINCEUR, EUCOM JAC, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, USCINCSOC, JSOC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCJFCOM, JFIC, CINCLANTFLT, COMMARFORLANT (b)(1) (b)(3)

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CABLETYPE: [redacted] (b)(3)
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